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Abstract If patients on the inten-
sive care unit (ICU) are awake and
life-sustaining treatment is suspended
because of the patients’ request,
because of recovering from the dis-
ease, or because independence from
organ function supportive or replace-
ment therapy outside the ICU can no
longer be achieved, these patients can
suffer before they inevitably die. In
The Netherlands, two scenarios are
possible for these patients: (1) deep
palliative (terminal) sedation through
ongoing administration of barbitu-
rates or benzodiazepines before
withdrawal of treatment, or (2)
deliberate termination of life (eutha-
nasia) before termination of
treatment. In this article we describe
two awake patients who asked for
withdrawal of life-sustaining mea-
sures, but who were dependent on
mechanical ventilation. We discuss
the doctrine of double effect in rela-
tion to palliative sedation on the ICU.
Administration of sedatives and
analgesics before withdrawal of
treatment is seen as normal palliative
care. We conclude that the doctrine of
the double effect is not applicable in
this situation, and mentioning it
criminalised the practice unnecessar-
ily and wrongfully.
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Introduction
Some conscious patients on the ICU request withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment in order to die. In The
Netherlands two scenarios can be offered: (1) deep
palliative sedation through administration of barbitu-
rates or benzodiazepines before withdrawal of
treatment, or (2) we can offer deliberate termination of
life (euthanasia) before termination of treatment. The
aim of palliative sedation is to prevent suffering by
lowering consciousness as a means to achieve this. In
this context, it is important to understand that with-
drawal of treatment, consequently allowing the patient
to die, after intentional lowering of consciousness is not
equivalent with euthanasia or deliberate termination of
life [1, 2]. Euthanasia is the intentional termination of
life of an adult patient on his or her request. This
presupposes voluntariness and a deliberate act, and
excludes every form of intentional non-voluntary ter-
mination of life. Usually the patient is sedated to
unconsciousness and then given a barbiturate and
muscle-paralysing agent. In the Termination of Life on
Request and Assisted Suicide Act, the requirements of
due care are described. Deliberate termination of life is
illegal in most countries in the world.
Recently, two of our conscious ICU patients asked for
discontinuation of life-sustaining measures. We want to
emphasise the central place for the autonomous choice of
the patient and the care of the patient and his or her
beneﬁts and interests.
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A ventilator- and inotropes-dependent 61-year-old patient
with a history of failed mitral valve replacement and
intra-operative total right ventricular myocardial infarc-
tion on our ICU requested withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and if necessary to deliberately terminate her
life. In a series of extensive deliberations with the patient
and after consulting an independent physician, we agreed
to offer her, according to her will, deep palliative sedation
followed by withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. In
the presence of her relatives, intravenous administration
of midazolam (starting dose 5 mg, thereafter 10 mg/h)
and fentanyl (100 lg starting dose, with 50 lg/h to fol-
low) was started. Within 15 min she was unconscious.
Subsequently, the inotropes, other life-sustaining medi-
cation and mechanical ventilation were withdrawn. She
died quietly from heart failure and circulatory collapse.
Patient B
Patient B, a 58-year-old building constructor, was admit-
ted to the general ICU with a traumatic spinal cord injury
at the C6–C7 level. In the following weeks, we were
unable to wean the patient off the ventilator. Furthermore,
he showed no improvements of his spinal cord injury and
remained tetraplegic. Several weeks after admission, he
repeatedly expressed a clear wish to withdraw treatment
and asked the ICU team to take him off the mechanical
ventilator. Because of the anticipated anguish, he further
wished to be deeply sedated beforehand. After consulting
two independent physicians, the nursing staff and a clini-
cal ethicist, the patient was granted his wish. A
combination of intravenously administered midazolam
(starting with a dose of 5 mg/h, thereafter 10 mg/h) and
low dose fentanyl (100 lg starting dose, with 50 lg/h to
follow) was started, and after he entered a deep sleep,
mechanical ventilation was withdrawn. Shortly thereafter,
he died peacefully, surrounded by his family.
Discussion
Approximately 80% of patients who die in an ICU in The
Netherlands die after organ function supportive care or
when organ function replacement therapy is withdrawn
(unpublished data, Erasmus MC, Department of Intensive
Care). Those surviving for a number of hours after dis-
continuation of treatment can develop symptoms such
as dyspnoea-associated respiratory distress, terminal
restlessness and ‘death rattle’. The majority of terminal
patients in the ICU are however unconscious due to the
severity of their disease or multiple organ failure, and are
not or only superﬁcially aware of the distressing
symptoms. The burden of terminal distress in such cases
rests predominantly with the relatives [3]. Most symp-
toms, however, can be successfully prevented or treated
[4]. A national guideline in The Netherlands on with-
drawal of futile intensive care measures focuses on
anticipation of distressing symptoms. Even in The Neth-
erlands, deliberate termination of life of ICU patients is
extremely rare [1].
PalliativesedationisinitiatedintheICUintheterminal
phase of life to prevent or relieve aggravating symptoms
suchasterminalrestlessness,deliriumoranxiety.Sedatives
areadministeredaimingtoinduceadeepunconscioussleep
in anticipation of death. In principle, the National Guide-
lines for Palliative Sedation of the Dutch Royal Society of
Medicine (KNMG) [5] are adhered to, based on the
understanding that in ICU practice, only midazolam and
propofolareusedforsedation.Morphineisnotaneffective
sedative and is not used in the ICU as such [6]. In the ICU,
the transition from sedation with mechanical ventilation to
palliative sedation is usually imperceptible. As a rule, the
sedative regime the patient received while being treated
with mechanical ventilation will be continued in the palli-
ative phase until death. The dose required in ICU patients
can be signiﬁcantly higher than mentioned in the recom-
mendations in the guidelines. If the patient is adequately
sedated before withdrawal of treatment, then this dose is
adhered to. It serves no purpose to adjust an adequate
sedativedoseeithertoalowerlevelortoincreaseittoabide
by the guidelines-recommended starting dose. After pub-
lication of the guidelines in 2005, palliative sedation was
recognised by the Public Prosecutor to be normal medical
practice. There is, however, a directive to prosecute and
bring before a court anyone who performs an act not stated
as such in the professional guidelines and to treat this as a
life-terminatingactwithouttheconsentofthepatient.Inthe
ICU, we deviate from the precise statements in the guide-
lines,butwithgoodreason.Duringthedocumentedfollow-
up of the use of sedatives in patients in the ICU, it is
important to judge whether one has acted according to the
professional standards. Comparing palliative sedation in
the ICU with other non-ICU settings is not realistic.
Crucial in the decision-making process in the descri-
bed cases is respect for the autonomy of the patient. Based
on the law, Dutch caregivers have to respect the wishes of
the patient if these are understandable and within the
accepted possibilities of medical care and also if the
patient is judged to be competent to make these judg-
ments. In the illustrated cases, caregivers had no reasons
to doubt the cognitive functioning and competency of the
patients.
One cannot always predict with certainty whether or
not aggravating symptoms will arise after stopping
treatment in the ICU. Patients who are awake may prefer
to be unconscious during dying with failing organ func-
tions after withdrawal of therapy. It is our moral duty as
caregivers in the ICU to acknowledge this request, and
2146applying palliative sedation prior to withdrawing active
treatment offers a righteous means [4]. But with this, we
digress from the Dutch Guidelines, which state that
administering sedatives to patients for the sole reason of
the patient’s wish to be free of suspected suffering at the
end of life, is not permitted. There must be objective
proof that there is unbearable suffering, which only can be
treated by lowering consciousness of the patient.
Many published ethical analyses on palliative sedation
use the doctrine of double effect (DDE), mentioning that
palliative sedation may hasten or induce death, and is
therefore morally questionable. When evaluating an
action, the DDE distinguishes between intended effects
and the consequences that are foreseen but unintended. As
long as intentions are good, it is permissible to perform
actions with foreseen consequences that would be wrong
to intend. In this line of thought, deliberately causing
death is morally wrong, even if desired by a competent
patient whose suffering cannot be relieved in another
way. If the patient dies unintentionally as a consequence
of another ethically justiﬁed intervention (e.g., with-
drawal of futile treatment), the action is morally
acceptable. The unintended but foreseen effect must also
be proportional to the intended good effects. The DDE is
often mentioned in justifying the use of opiates and sed-
atives at the end of life to relieve suffering. There is a
growing body of evidence showing that administration of
normal doses of sedatives and opiates at the end of life
does not shorten life, but prolongs it [7–11], and only
scarce anecdotal data mention that opioids can hasten
death [12], making the DDE in end-of-life care a myth
[13]. It is concluded that ‘‘Clinical studies and decades of
experience by experts in pain management and palliative
care have shown that the double effect of pain medication
has little basis in medical fact;…the myth of the double
effect of pain medication, directly contributing to the
maltreatment of suffering at the end of life. It is ironic that
an ethical principle that is used to justify adequate opioid
analgesics contributes to the maltreatment of pain’’ [13].
The same could be said about palliative sedation with
barbiturates and benzodiazepines. DDE in end-of-life care
is nothing more than a myth, and using it to label
palliative sedation and administration of opiates at the end
of life questionable and only defendable from the per-
spective of the DDE, unsound.
When a competent patient on the ICU asks for ter-
mination of treatment, we should seriously take this
request into deliberation. The principle of respecting
autonomy is a strong guidance in bioethics.
The American Academy of Neurology published a
position paper concerning the care of conscious, compe-
tent patients with profound paralysis [14, 15]. They
concluded that such patients have the right to make health
care decisions about their own lives, including acceptance
or refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Once patients have
decided to forego life-sustaining treatment, physicians
have an ethical obligation to minimise their subsequent
suffering. This is particularly true of profoundly paralysed
patients, because cognition and sensation may be intact,
and they are capable of great suffering.
Conclusion
In competent ICU patients in The Netherlands who are
terminally dependent on life-sustaining measures, such as
mechanical ventilation and administration of vasoactive
agents, withdrawal of these measures is ethically good
care when they ask for withdrawal. This is not to be seen
as deliberate termination of life, even if they die after the
withdrawal of life-sustaining measures. Administration of
sedatives and analgetics before withdrawal of treatment is
normal palliative care. The DDE is not applicable in this
situation.
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